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The history of the United States offers an 
uninterrupted series of wars which demanded 
as their aftermath the exercise by its officers 
of civil governmental functions. Despite the 
precedents of military government in Mexico, 
California, the Southern states, Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, Panama, China and the Philippines, and 
elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been 
learned. In none of the service schools devoted 
to the higher training of officers has a single 
course on the nature and scope of military 
government been established. 
Colonel Irwin Hunt,  
Military Government,  
U.S. Army Field Manual 27-5, 1940
In the last decade, the United States has found 
itself fully immersed in nation building, despite its 
alleged distaste for such endeavors. U.S. military 
forces in particular have been at the center of 
these efforts, building schools in Iraq, staffing 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout 
Afghanistan and training soldiers in Mozambique.2 
U.S. Army platoon leaders hand out micro grants 
to small business owners and help stand up city 
councils. Civil servants who once trained for 
peacetime development work now find themselves 
mediating tribal disputes in remote mountain 
provinces. Regardless of the efficacy of such 
efforts, public statements by both President Obama 
and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggest that 
nation building and related activities are preferred 
solutions in the war against terrorism.3 Yet despite 
the enormous complexity and ambition of such 
efforts, there remains a gap in the training and 
education for nation building. 
This paper details the U.S. Army−established 
School of Military Government and its related 
Civil Affairs Training Program that prepared forces 
for occupational duties in Europe and Asia. It 
highlights the demonstrated effectiveness both 
of its curriculum and approach to education and 
of its impact on the occupation of Germany and 
Japan, which offer important lessons for today’s 
military faced with similar challenges. If nation 
building, particularly with economic growth as a 
key component, is to assume a greater role as a 
component of foreign policy or national security 
strategy, it needs to consume a greater role of our 
planning, analysis, and organizational design. Civil 
Affairs and several other functional areas within the 
military play a significant role in aspects of nation 
building today and would benefit from education 
focused on such matters. Other beneficial initiatives 
would include creating a mechanism for drawing 
experts into and out of the military to serve as 
nation-builders at a level commensurate with their 
experience, providing a more effective and less 
expensive option than hiring contractors. 
Given our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and their extraordinary cost in resources, rethinking 
how the U.S. military plans and implements 
transitions after hostilities is vital.4 Our latest 
entrée intro Libya supports this assertion: firing 
cruise missiles, although costly, is relatively simple 
to plan and execute, but what do we do next? 
War-to-peace transition is difficult, in part, because 
the responsibility for war is straightforward, but 
responsibility for what comes afterwards is not 
nearly as simple—there isn’t one organization to 
which the military can pass off responsibility for 
the occupied or pacified territory. Furthermore, 
different aspects of transition occur at different 
speeds; for example, it is relatively easy to train 
police, but especially difficult to establish an entire 
criminal justice system. 
2. Robert Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth,” The Atlantic, July 2003. Kaplan mentions that Special Operations soldiers are in some sixty-five countries, 
to include Nepal, the Philippines, Colombia, Yemen, Mongolia, and Romania.
3. Gregory Grimes, “Civil Affairs: Gathering the Reins,” Small Wars Journal, March 23, 2009,  http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/civil-affairs-
gathering-the-re/. 
4. Samuel R. Berger, Brent Scowcroft, and William Nash, “In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post Conflict Capabilities,” Council on Foreign 
Relations Independent Task Force, New York, 2005.  
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5. History of the School of Military Government, 16 February 1946.
6. Carl J. Schramm, “Institutionalizing Economic Analysis in the U.S. Military: The Basis for Preventive Defense,” Joint Forces Quarterly, April 2011.
7. See Carl J. Schramm, “Expeditionary Economics: Spurring Growth After Conflicts and Disasters,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010.
8. Rebecca Patterson and Dane Stangler, “Building a Field and Setting Forth a Research Agenda,” Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation,  
November 2010.
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Finally, resourcing is always an issue—the 
indigenous population of a foreign country is not 
a U.S. constituency. Finding adequate personnel 
particularly with the correct skills remains a 
significant challenge. Even when executive branch 
departments such as the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture or Commerce, send personnel to fill 
the military’s expertise gap in nation building, the 
individuals assigned have significant institutional 
and legal barriers to assisting foreign countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given these institutional constraints, what 
can be done? Rather than accept the status quo, 
advocate that “the interagency’ or “whole-of-
government” can solve the problem, or look for 
a panacea in every new idea that comes out of 
Washington, we should look back on an institution 
that prepared U.S. forces for nation building at 
a time in our history when that capability was 
most needed. Conceived before Pearl Harbor, 
the U.S. Army established a School of Military 
Government in 1942 that trained military officers 
for the myriad tasks associated with governing 
occupied territories. As U.S. involvement in the war 
expanded, the program grew from one military-run 
school in Charlottesville, Virginia, to ten universities 
around the country. In eighteen classes between 
May 11, 1942 and February 16, 1946, the school 
graduated over a thousand officers, most of them 
members of the U.S. Army, but others from the 
Navy and Marine Corps, and from many of the 
United Nations, including Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Great 
Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Poland. Its graduates assisted tactical and 
operational forces of the United States and many 
of its allies in Italy, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, the islands of 
the South West Pacific, the Philippines, Okinawa, 
Japan, and Korea. Military government and civil 
affairs officers served with distinction on the staffs 
of theaters of operations, task forces, army groups, 
armies, corps, and divisions, in general staff or 
special staff sections—almost wherever American 
troops had engaged the enemy.5 If the United 
States was able to create such an institution that 
had a positive impact on the outcome of the war, 
and on the creation of a sustainable peace during a 
time of extreme crisis (the Great Depression and an 
attack on the homeland), it is worth revisiting such 
an idea today. 
We should fully expect that the United 
States and its forces will engage in economic 
reconstruction again and again, as it currently is 
the exit strategy for today’s wars.6 The emerging 
field of Expeditionary Economics, advanced by the 
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, suggests that 
a country’s political and social stability stems from 
economic opportunity and job growth.7 Its premise 
is that economic development is essential for the 
longer-term success of many military interventions, 
but while the United States has enjoyed military 
success abroad, our discouraging record in 
promoting economic growth and development 
has at times prevented us from attaining strategic 
success.8 Nation building and its associated tasks 
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By March 1945, even before Berlin fell, the United States 
had deployed 150 School of Military Government-trained 
detachments across occupied Germany.
6H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  S c h o o l  o f  M i l i t a r y  G o v e r n m e n t
always have been a challenge for the U.S. military, 
which normally is not equipped or trained to 
undertake such endeavors, but instead is relied on 
by default as the only actor with the responsiveness 
and capability to perform them. What is particularly 
instructive is to examine a case where the military 
actually prepared systematically for nation 
building—the World War II−era School of Military 
Government—and also implemented military 
government with relative success. 
 
 
 
History of the School of 
Military Government
What chance has a foreigner to teach the 
basic values of life to a conquered people, who, 
when he lays his notes on the desk, lays beside 
it an automatic pistol? Germans and Japanese 
will have to learn by hard experience that their 
philosophies and their practices lead to the 
destruction and death and then teach this great 
discovery to their people in their own way.
Professor Ralph H. Gabriel,  
“Military Government and the  
Civil Population,” lecture at the  
School of Military Government, 1943
By the 1940s, the American army had been 
acquiring experience in military government 
and civil affairs for a century, having frequently 
administered control of civilian populations.9 In 
liberated territories, civil affairs functions are 
designed to ensure that military operations against 
the enemy are not hampered by the civilian 
population while simultaneously assisting and 
encouraging the civilian population to resume 
normal life.10 Military government of an enemy 
country, on the other hand, is responsible for 
exercising the will of the military commander and 
is only concerned with the civilian population 
inasmuch as they affect military operations.11 In 
every war since the War of 1812, the military has 
been required to establish military control over 
the civil government of occupied territories—
including the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, parts 
of Mexico, the Southwest, California, and several 
southern states during our Civil War.12 Occasionally, 
the treatment of civilian problems contributed 
materially to the achievement of military aims of 
the campaign.13 More often, though, American 
military government followed in the wake of 
military operations and had a political rather than 
military purpose, as was the case following the  
Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World 
War I. In 1918, American commanders governed 
parts of Siberia, Dalmatia, and the Rhineland. 
However, these earlier experiences were dwarfed 
by the enormously complex governance and 
economic problems facing the United States in the 
years following World War II.14
Although the United States had conducted 
military government during nearly all of its past 
wars, it always had done so as a kind of reluctant 
afterthought. Deliberate planning seemed to 
suggest cold-bloodedness, disregard for the 
traditional civil-military relationship, and disdain 
for the presumed natural superiority of civilians in 
the art of government.15 The leaders of the U.S. 
9. Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860−1941 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military 
History, 1998).
10. Colonel Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers,” Public Opinion Quarterly 7, no. 4: The Occupation of Enemy Territory 
(Winter 1943).
11. “Conception of Military Government,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 29 September 1944.
12. Harris, “Selection and Training,” 694-706.
13. Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army 1898−1941 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).
14. Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947).
15. Earl Frederick Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany, 1944−1946, (Washington, DC: U.S. Center of Military History, 1975).
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Army in 194116 were aware of the significant role 
that military government operations were bound 
to assume in conditions of total war, both for 
winning battles and the final peace.17 As such, 
they understood the need for a special personnel 
procurement and training program. Although most 
of the larger policies of any occupation theoretically 
would be determined by agencies other than 
the War Department or the army (political policy 
developed by the State Department, fiscal policy by 
the Treasury Department, etc.), the army would be 
responsible for administering military government. 
The number of personnel required for this task could 
not be reached merely by commissioning American 
civilians expert in foreign administrations; there were 
too few of them.18 Consequently, the secretary of 
war approved a plan to train officers for civil affairs 
in December 1941, and in May 1942 the School of 
Military Government (SOMG) opened its doors.19
The mission of the SOMG was to train Army 
officers for future detail to military government 
and civil affairs activities.20 The students were 
being trained to serve as the administrative and 
advisory assistants to military governors with a 
thorough curriculum that covered government and 
administration, legal affairs, government finance, 
money and banking, natural resources, agriculture, 
industry and commerce, labor, public works and 
utilities, transportation systems, communications, 
public health and sanitation, public safety, 
education, and public welfare.21 The commanding 
general of a theater of operations is, under 
authority of the laws of war, the military governor 
of the occupied area. The school was located in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, and generally instructed 
100 officers at a time.22 The original candidates 
were required to possess experience in a former 
military government, or in federal, state, county, 
or city government.23 Civilian lawyers, physicians, 
civil engineers, and others acquainted with certain 
foreign countries by former residence or travel also  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
were considered. The first students were civilians 
from local and state government, private 
legal practice, law enforcement, public health, 
transportation, and education.24 They were given 
16. Most of the senior leaders of the military during the 1940s had some experience with military government and its challenges during their 
careers. For example, George Marshall was familiar with the importance of military government and civil affairs having served in the Philippines 
twice and in China. Significantly, he also was responsible for building and developing Civilian Conservation Corps camps in the 1930s.
17. Larry I. Bland, Joellen K. Bland, and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, ed., George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue 
(Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991). 
18. Holborn, American Military Government. 
19. The term “military government” will be used exclusively in references to activities within enemy territories, while “civil affairs” will continue to 
indicate G5/Civil Affairs activities in liberated territories.
20. Administrative Circular No. 1, 1942, (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, April 17, 1942), 1. Although SOMG initially targeted 
only Army officers, the Navy established their own school of military government.
21. Topical Outline of Military Government Handbook, prepared for the Military Government Division, Provost Marshall’s Office by the School of 
Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record Group 389, Entry 443, Box 841.
22. Administrative Circular No. 1, 1942, 1.
23. Memorandum for the Secretary of War from Allen W. Gullion, MG, Provost Marshall, 1942, NARA Record Group Number 389, Entry A1 442, Box 
738.
24. NARA Record Group Number 389, Entry A1 442, Box 740.
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The School of Military Government gave students a 
foundation in relevant international law and Army 
regulations to equip them as legal administrators.
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direct commissions and sent to SOMG for training 
in military organization and methods, and in the 
political and social institutions of foreign countries, 
equipping them to use their skills effectively as 
members of a military team in occupied territories.25 
The first portion of the instructional course was 
devoted to a study of the general principles of 
military government—relevant international law and 
Army regulations, general procedures and practices, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a historical review of American experiences in 
military government, the techniques of the Germans 
in World War I and of the Germans and Japanese 
in the current war, and a miniature course in public 
administration. These were designed to cover 
general principles applicable to the operations of 
military government in any area. The last portion of 
the course was devoted to the study of the  
backgrounds of particular areas of potential 
occupation. Here the institutions, customs, 
economy, psychology, and general nature of each 
area were dealt with to provide the student officers 
as intimate knowledge as possible. The principal 
study was directed toward Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, but between ten and twelve other smaller 
special areas were considered.26
In researching the literature and experiences of 
previous military governments, the school soon 
discovered that if the Army’s mission in military 
government was to be adequately performed, its 
current authorized productive capacity of 450 per 
year would be grossly inadequate.27 At the time, 
there were few personnel statistics of military 
occupations; the German occupational personnel 
in Belgium from 1914 to 1918 was 3,500 and 
more than 7,000 German occupational personnel 
were involved in the government of Poland.28 The 
Rhineland occupation by American forces after 
World War I, which only involved a population of 
about one million, required 213 military government 
officers, or 0.1 percent of the occupation force.29 
Based on these ratios, the Military Government 
Division concluded in September 1942 that 6,000 
trained officers would be needed worldwide and 
another 6,000 would be recruited from tactical 
units as areas were occupied.30
As the military realized how many officers 
would be required to execute occupational duties 
post−World War II, it became evident that the 
school at Charlottesville was not large enough. 
To supplement the school at Charlottesville, other 
colleges and universities around the United States 
established programs to train officers for civil affairs 
and military government.31 Yale, Harvard, Princeton, 
Stanford, the University of Michigan, the University 
25. Holborn, American Military Government. 
26. The country-specific education was meant to familiarize the students with the countries in which they were about to serve. They were not 
in the school for a period that would qualify them to be “experts” in a specific country. Instead, it provided context for the principles and case 
studies that were taught and added an important element of realism to the problems they would likely face. Memorandum to the President from 
the Secretary of War, November 1942 (Washington, DC: U.S. War Department, 1942).
27. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany.
28. Interestingly, the Germans and Japanese had long anticipated military government, and planned and trained personnel to execute it.
29. B.G. Wickersham, memorandum to the Provost Marshall General, 17 June 1942, Charlottesville, Virginia.
30. Draft, Final Report of the Present Director, MG Division, PMGO, March 1945, in PMG, MG Division.
31. “Curriculum for Specialists,” PMG Gullion for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 6 February 1943, PMGO Files, History of Military Government 
R e v i s i t i n g  a  S c h o o l  o f  M i l i t a r y  G o v e r n m e n t :  H o w  R e a n i m a t i n g  a
W o r l d  W a r  I I - E r a  I n s t i t u t i o n  C o u l d  P r o f e s s i o n a l i z e  M i l i t a r y  N a t i o n  B u i l d i n g
Recruiting and training a local police force was a critical 
task for SOMG graduates in post-war Germany.
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of Chicago, Boston University, the University of 
Wisconsin, Western Reserve College,32 and the 
University of Pittsburgh all fielded programs that 
were attended by hundreds of civil affairs officers.33 
The Army did not design these schools to be mere 
replicas of the Charlottesville program. Although 
the universities had to adhere to the basic tenets of 
military instruction and focus on specific countries, 
the program directors found themselves free to 
create their own schedules, assignments, teaching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
methods, and even student policy.34 This made 
the learning environment more malleable than 
traditional military education. The schools also 
focused more on the abilities of the individuals as 
opposed to any rank, which created a different 
dynamic than the usual hierarchy of the military. At 
Charlottesville, the importance of rank was greatly 
diminished in favor of the collegiality not only 
between students, but even among professors, 
who often found themselves similar in age and 
background to those they taught. The civilian 
universities took this one step further, allowing the 
students to select their own group leaders by vote 
instead of appointment by seniority.35 
The Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS),36 as 
the Army dubbed them, were far less concerned 
with the high-level regional and national planning 
for which the SOMG graduates one day would be 
responsible. Instead, the civilian-run program would 
focus its curriculum more on the day-to-day work 
of running an occupied city or town; therefore, the 
students spent more time studying the individual 
nations that the United States expected to occupy 
and their characteristics. Although the students 
eventually ranged in rank from second lieutenant 
to lieutenant colonel, most held junior grades 
and all were expected to be given assignments 
as specialists and technicians in the field instead 
of staff assignments, for which Charlottesville 
provided training. The CATS graduate was 
expected to deal directly with the people in 
occupied areas; the Charlottesville graduate 
primarily with his own and allied staffs.37 At its 
inception, the most attractive aspect of CATS was 
its ultimate expandability, since its faculties could 
provide courses in many fields on short notice, 
and when training demands increased, additional 
universities could be brought into the program.38
Training, Tab 19, in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, DC: U.S. Center of Military 
History), 80.
32. Western Reserve College federated in 1967 with Case Institute of Technology and became Case Western Reserve University. 
33. Records of these schools can be found at NARA, Entry A1 442, Record Group 389, Stack 290, Row 33, Compartment 34, Shelf 05−, Box 738. Box 
739 holds the lecture material from the first course. Box 740 lists the biographies of civil affairs trainers. Box 741−752 lists all the information on 
students and course materials for the first seven classes of trainees.
34. Representatives of Harvard University, “Summary of Sessions of the University Conference at the School of Military Government,” 
(Charlottesville, Virginia, 16 and 17 April 1943), NARA Record Group 389, Entry 442, Box 806.
35. Fred Eggan, “Conference on Training Requirements for Military Government Specialists,” (16−18 April 1943), NARA Record Group 389 Entry 442, 
Box 806, Folder 337.
36. The program itself was called the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP), whereas the schools were referred to as CATS.  
37. U.S. War Department Bureau of Public Relations, “Civil Affairs Training Program,” 13 February 1944, in PMG, MG Division, decimal file 000.7; MG 
Gullion, memorandum for the Chief of Staff, sub: Training of Civil Affairs Officers, 13 September 1943, in PMG, MG Division, decimal file 353, in 
Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany.
38. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany.
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The SOMG trained students to interface effectively  
with the local population.
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The value of the readily expandable program 
was proved sooner than anyone expected. In 
August 1943, the impending Italian surrender 
increased the requirements for Military 
Government (MG) trained officers, and by 
September the planning for the invasion of France, 
plus the possibility that the German defeat might 
come sooner than previously anticipated, raised 
the prospect of vastly increased demands in the 
near future.39 At Charlottesville, the classes were 
increased to 175 students and the course reduced 
to twelve weeks. The CATS took in 450 students 
per month; in the last four months of 1943, 
Charlottesville and the CATS schools together 
turned out more than 2,000 graduates, thereby 
nearly filling the estimated wartime European 
requirements. 
In addition to graduating hundreds of officers 
in a short period of time, the program also 
institutionalized these concepts by creating 
doctrine. The Army’s Office of the Provost 
Marshall, which oversaw the school, prepared a 
number of reference manuals.40 These references 
provided a common body of knowledge for both 
military governance specialists and combat soldiers. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Army developed a vast 
number of detailed training publications for civil 
affairs: Bank Accounting and Operations in Japan, 
Government Finance, Technical and Economic 
Troops in Occupied Europe, and Field Protection of 
Objects of Art and Archives, to name a few.41 The 
level of detailed preparation for the World War II 
occupations reflects a remarkable grasp of both the 
nature and magnitude of the challenges of stability 
operations.42 
Evaluating its Effectiveness
Allied Military Government has earned the 
gratitude of the United Nations for a distinct 
and important contribution to the winning of 
the war.
Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, 
Commanding General, Fifth Army, 1944
Although the curriculum and what occurred at 
the school itself are informative, the performance 
of the graduates is even more illustrative in 
evaluating the school’s effectiveness. Those who 
graduated from the SOMG as well as CATS were 
assigned throughout the European theater in 
vast numbers. They brought with them many of 
the lessons they learned in Charlottesville and at 
the various universities they attended. While it 
is difficult to determine exactly what individuals 
retained from the lectures and group work, it 
seems that many officers looked back on their 
time with some conscious appreciation of the 
information they learned, as demonstrated through 
many postwar memoirs and publications.43
The tactical commander’s appreciation of the 
value of military government has been nicely 
stated by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, 
Commanding General of the Fifth Army, in a letter 
to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer of the Fifth Army, 
dated 9 November 1944:
On the occasion of the first anniversary 
of the establishment of the Allied Control 
Commission in Italy, I should like to express 
my appreciation of the work which has been 
39. Ibid. 
40. NARA Record Group 389, Stack 290, Row 34, Compartment 2, Shelf 4−6, Entry A1 443, Boxes 867−884.
41. Checklist of Civil Affairs Handbooks, Office of the Provost Marshall General, Military Government Division, Liaison and Studies Branch, 25 
August 1944.
42. Russell R. Hula, “Stability Operations and Government: An Inherently Military Function,” in Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of 
Military Power in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Department of the Army, 2010). 
43. Raymond Joseph Parrott, “An Education for Occupation: Army Civil Affairs Training And Military Planning for Postwar Germany” (thesis, 
University of Virginia, 2008).
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done during the past year … Throughout the 
entire period of the Fifth Army’s service in 
Italy, Allied Military Government (AMG) has 
been one of its integral parts … The plans 
made by the AMG personnel at Fifth Army 
Headquarters have proven sound and their 
execution efficient. The Army Command has 
never had to concern itself with problems of 
civil government, which would have inevitably 
been a serious burden had AMG failed. Thus 
AMG has played an important part in the 
successive advances of the Fifth Army. In the 
cities of Salerno, Naples, Rome, Siena, Pisa, 
Florence, Lucca and Pistoia, in turn, as well 
as in numerous smaller cities and towns, 
the Fifth Army’s AMG has created effective 
government. All of these cities had known the 
ravages of war and the destruction caused by 
a ruthless foe. The inhabitants were, as a rule, 
all but starving; public utilities were wrecked; 
banks and courts were closed; political unrest 
was widespread; educational institutions were 
either ruined or closed. So effective have been 
the efforts of AMB that these conditions were 
corrected in a remarkably brief time.44 
The greatest impact by those trained at the 
school pertains to the postwar treatment of 
Germany. The Army created a “Basic Handbook 
for the Military Government of Germany” as well 
as numerous Civil Affairs guides in the summer 
of 1944, advocating a relatively progressive 
administration of Germany through the 
implementation of social, political, and economic 
recovery measures. The military’s approach was 
a stark contrast to many of the punitive policies 
proposed in Washington. The majority of the team 
who wrote these manuals were SOMG and CATS 
graduates. Despite President Roosevelt’s criticisms 
of the manual, which suggested relatively rapid 
rejuvenation of German industry, it became the 
unofficial policy in the American occupied zone. 
General Lucius Clay was assigned to serve 
as the deputy military governor in Germany in 
1945 and subsequently as the military governor. 
Upon taking up his position, he found himself 
surrounded by graduates and instructors 
associated with the various MG training schools. 
Former SOMG director Cornelius Wickersham was 
his predecessor as deputy military governor and 
was responsible for much of the planning and 
creation of the staff that Clay inherited. Even some 
of the civilian advisors to the military governor had 
worked with the armed forces through stints as 
instructors in the various schools.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the aforementioned testimonies 
provide evidence of the effectiveness of the schools, 
these impacts did not extend beyond the post−
World War II reconstruction because the SOMG 
was disbanded and many of the MG/CA lessons 
were forgotten. This happened for several reasons. 
First of all, since its inception, the controversial 
nature of military government has made it equally 
objectionable in civilian and military communities. 
Second, in an attempt to clearly define civil-military 
control and fix responsibilities and requirements 
following the occupations during World War II, the 
National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 created the 
National Security Council with the initial purpose 
to serve as a mechanism to coordinate political 
and military questions.45 In reality, this shifted 
44. History of the School of Military Government.  
45. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “History of the National Security Council,” available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
history.html.
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The economic impact of war on civilian society is as 
profound now as it was in postwar Germany, yet there  
is currently no trained cadre of professional nation 
builders equipped to operate in the early stages of  
post-conflict occupation.
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the responsibility for leading complex political-
military challenges away from the military.46 Third, 
the U.S. military quickly adjusted its strategies, 
doctrine, and capabilities to those based heavily on 
deterrence during the Cold War.47 Demobilization 
pressures, in addition to the dwindling requirement 
for trained military government officers in the 
wake of successes in Japan and Germany, led 
to the contraction of training, resources, and 
infrastructure, leaving only a civil affairs shell with 
its capabilities predominantly in the reserves to play 
supporting roles in CMO.48 
Relevance to the  
Current U.S. Experience 
The United States and the international 
community cannot shy away from the difficult 
task of pursuing stabilization in conflict and 
post-conflict environments. In countries like 
Iraq and Afghanistan, building the capacity 
necessary for security, economic growth, and 
good governance is the only path to long term 
peace and security.
National Security Strategy, 
White House, 2010
Revisiting this historical example is particularly 
relevant today since over the past decade, the 
United States has become more deeply involved 
in nation building than at any point since World 
War II.49 Commanders today face problems similar 
to U.S. historical experience with nation building: 
they are forced to maintain order between mutually 
antagonistic tribes, create an indigenous security 
apparatus, and foster economic growth, education, 
and law. The Philippines campaign of the early 1900s 
is such an example: while officers built schools, 
roads, clinics, markets, and courtrooms, they also 
scoured the country for guerillas and other rebels. 
Villages and provinces that accepted pacification 
received better roads to waterborne trade, schools, 
markets, and a number of other benefits. Those who 
collaborated were given most of the powers they 
had fought for as insurgents.50 The current focus on 
nation building similarly is tied to counterinsurgency, 
yet some degree of nation building is essential to any 
transition from war to peace. 
Furthermore, since the majority of current 
conflicts do not enjoy uniform security, governance, 
or economic conditions, there is a strong case for 
a corps of professionals who have experience in 
and extensive training for restarting governments, 
spurring economic growth, and creating indigenous 
security forces. The Three Block War concept, 
described by U.S. Marine General Charles Krulak, 
suggests that soldiers on the modern battlefield 
may be required to conduct full scale military action, 
peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian aid 
within the span of three contiguous city blocks.51 This 
serves as an instructive example at the micro level 
of what an entire country may look like at a discrete 
point in time, with different cities and provinces 
having distinctly unique economic, governance, and 
security challenges. If the United States is to succeed 
in transitioning an occupied territory to a nation 
with a trajectory of economic growth, capable of 
governing its own people, the government needs to 
have professional nation-builders on call with real-
world skills.52 The School of Military Government 
and the Civil Affairs Training Program of the 1940s 
offer a methodology for training personnel in the 
tasks associated with military government and civil 
affairs in occupied territories. 
46. Hula, 269.
47. Troy Thomas, “Control Roaming Dogs: Governance Operations in Future Conflict,” Military Review (January−February 2006): 79.
48. Hula, 269.
49. Manuals such as U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, both discuss at length governance 
and economic considerations as vital to a successful military campaign.
50. Brian McAllister, “Batangas: Ending the Philippines War,” in Between War and Peace, ed. Colonel Matt Moten (New York: Free Press, 2011).
51. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine (January 1999).
52. Nathan Hodge, Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the Nation Builders (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011).
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Addressing the Issue 
of Contractors
The United States is severely handicapped 
by its undersized and underresourced 
civilian planning and operational capacity 
for preventative security, stabilization and 
reconstruction … the U.S. military will 
require its own capabilities to meet security 
cooperation goals, abide by the Law of War 
during combat and ensure U.S. capability 
for reconstruction and stabilization in less 
permissive environments or sectors.
Kathleen Hicks, 
Center for Strategic and  
International Studies, 2010
By early 2003, nearly six in ten of the 
personnel running USAID’s overseas missions 
were contractors.
Special Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction, 
Hard Lessons, 2009  
 
Although the military always has relied on 
contractors to support military operations, over the 
past ten years reliance on contractors has greatly 
increased, resulting in an expeditionary workforce 
that at times has comprised significantly more 
contracted than uniformed personnel.53 While 
contractors are widely viewed as being vital to U.S. 
efforts in the region, their use does raise concerns 
of transparency and accountability. In particular, 
the use of contractors in the conduct of foreign 
policy−related tasks suggests that a SOMG is 
required to prepare the military, or government 
civilians, for nation-building tasks.  
Contractors working for the U.S. military, the 
State Department, or other government agencies 
during contingency operations are classified as 
noncombatants who have no combat immunity 
under international law if they engage in hostilities, 
and whose conduct may be attributable to the 
United States.�54 Contractors who commit crimes 
while deployed are subject to U.S. prosecution 
under criminal statutes that apply extraterritorially 
or within the special maritime and territorial  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
jurisdiction of the United States, or by means of 
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). 
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
2007 (P.L. 109-364) makes military contractors 
supporting the armed forces in Iraq subject to 
53. Moshe Schwartz, DoD Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, Congressional Research Service, August 2009.
54. Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service, January 2010.
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Broad use of contractors in lieu of uniformed military 
personnel raises questions of accountability and 
transparency, not to mention fiscal efficiency. In  
post-war Germany, American troops, many trained  
at the School of Military Government, were  
unquestionably the face of the reconstruction effort. 
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court-martial jurisdiction.55 Despite congressional 
efforts to expand court-martial jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction under MEJA, some contractors may 
remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, civil 
or military, for improper conduct overseas.56
In addition to the legal questions of the use 
of contractors, there also is the question of 
which private security functions are “inherently 
governmental” (vital to U.S. interests) in nature 
and therefore ought to be performed by public 
officials. This includes those actions that can 
“determine, protect, and advance United States 
economic, political, territorial, property, or 
other interests by military or diplomatic action, 
civil or criminal justice proceedings,” contract 
management, and functions that can “significantly 
affect the life, liberty, or property of private 
persons …”57 Inherently governmental actions 
include, among other things, conduct of foreign 
relations and the determination of foreign policy, 
and the direction and control of intelligence and 
counterintelligence operations.58 This definition 
suggests many of the tasks and responsibilities 
that contractors are providing in Iraq and 
Afghanistan should be performed by government 
employees.
The justification for using contractors frequently 
has been heralded as a cost-saving measure, but 
the numbers tell a different story. For example, 
individual private security contractors are paid 
between $600 to upwards of $1,000 per day. In 
contrast, a noncommissioned officer with twenty 
years of experience costs about $150 per day. 
Although this disparity does not account for the 
expense of health care, retirement, and the 
education investment in the noncommissioned 
officer, the difference is still staggering. This is even 
more worrisome when one considers how the 
contractor received his or her training. Many of 
those contracted to perform such services are 
either former military or retired military. So, the 
ancillary costs may in some cases be borne by the 
military itself, through previous expenditures on 
training and/or retirement on top of paying the 
contract.59 Finally, the method of contracting on a 
“cost-plus” basis60 provides no incentive to 
minimize costs, since the contracting company has 
100 percent of its expenses covered, plus overhead, 
plus a profit.61 With the complicated layering of 
subcontractors, in many cases the fee for services 
can be as high as quadruple what the individual 
providing the service is being paid.62
If the reality of using contractors to provide 
inherently government functions actually is not 
providing cost savings, then the U.S. government 
should develop the capability to provide the 
services currently contracted. This paper does not 
55. Elsea, 2010.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid. § 5(2) (B) (i), (ii), and (iii).
58. 48 C.F.R. 7.503.
59. According to a 2011 report by Rick Wrona at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Currently, private military and 
security companies tout the cost effectiveness of their services, but they neglect to consider that the sunk costs regarding the training of many 
contractors has already been provided by the United States military. Maintaining the current situation—in which the United States Government 
pays hundreds of thousands of dollars to train an individual, then loses the individual to the private sector, then re-hires the same individual as a 
security contractor while, simultaneously, paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to train a replacement service member—is nonsensical.”
60. Cost-plus means the U.S. government pays all the company’s expenses, plus its costs, plus 2 percent profit on top.
61. The most illustrative examples of the astronomical costs of contracting are in the security contractor space. An article by Joseph Neff and Jay 
Price of The News & Observer describes the confusing cost structure of just one contract. For an individual hired to provide security, the salary 
was $600 a day or $180,000 per year. The contracting company, Blackwater (now Xe) in their example, added a 36 percent markup, plus its overhead 
costs, and sent the bill to a Kuwaiti company that ordinarily runs hotels. That company, Regency Hotel, tacked on its costs for buying vehicles and 
weapons and a profit and sent an invoice to a German food services company called ESS that cooked meals for the troops. ESS added its costs and 
profit and sent its bill to Halliburton, which also added overhead and a profit and presented the final bill to the Pentagon.
62. This example is cited in “The Use of Private Contractors in Iraq proves costly,” by Joseph Neff and Jay Price, Associated Press, October 25, 
2004, and is recounted again by Neff in “Private Military Contractors: Determining Accountability: The reliance on private contractors and a web 
of subcontractors can come with a staggering price,” Nieman Reports, Harvard University, Summer 2008, accessed March 26, 2011, http://www.
nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/100037/Private-Military-Contractors-Determining-Accountability.aspx. 
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address the security force requirements per se, but 
the number of contractors required for inherently 
government functions should be dramatically 
minimized. The proposed school of military 
government would provide training and education 
for the skills currently required to fill the capability 
gap identified through the use of contractors. This 
paper is not suggesting that maintenance and/or 
food service functions should not be provided by 
contractors, but that where personnel are hired to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provide expertise that directly impacts the nation  
building of an occupied territory, those personnel 
should be government employees. Furthermore, 
those government employees should be adequately 
prepared for the endeavor on which they are about 
to embark. The school of military government 
would provide the body of knowledge and the 
outlet for government employees to provide the 
requisite skills in nation building.  
 
 
Refashioning a School of 
Military Government
Re-establishing an authentic School of 
Military Government could provide the 
foundational basis to once again allow trained 
commissioned and non-commissioned Army 
and Marine officers to “take charge” on the 
ground and utilize all available resources—
military, non-military, U.S. and indigenous—to 
stabilize an area suffering from upheaval, both 
during combat or stability operations and in 
the critical weeks and months post hostilities.
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Brent C.  
Bankus and James O. Kievit,63  
Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2008
There is a strong case to be made that 
recreating an educational institution that trains 
personnel for rebuilding societies after conflict 
or natural disaster is required. Nation building 
education and training does not exist in one 
central place within the current military structure. 
Many military educational programs touch on 
issues related to nation building tangentially or as 
a component of a broader curriculum. Civilians 
tasked with supporting the military also have 
inconsistent training and experience. The historical 
experience with the SOMG provides a possible 
model for educating a group of nation-builders to 
both implement and oversee the complexities of 
a postwar transition by the United States military. 
It should draw upon the expertise of those within 
academia, the private sector, and government to 
provide an educational curriculum and capability 
for analysis and assessment of ongoing nation-
building efforts. Like its predecessor, the faculty 
would conduct research and publish manuals 
pertaining to the countries likely to require some 
form of nation building. 
There are several reasons to reestablish a 
SOMG. First, it would provide civil affairs officers 
an educational program to properly prepare them 
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63. Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Brent C. Bankus and James O. Kievit, “Reopen a Joint School of Military Government and Administration?” Small 
Wars & Insurgencies, 1743-9558, 19, no. 1 (2008), 137−143. 
Civil Affairs officers are currently often tasked with 
designing and implementing education policy, a task for 
which SOMG graduates were much better prepared.
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for the critical and highly specialized roles they are 
expected to play. Secondly, there is a broader need 
for nation building expertise than civil affairs alone 
can provide. Intelligence officers and strategists 
also should be trained and educated in military 
government and civil affairs considerations so 
they can adequately advise military commanders 
throughout the war planning process. Establishing 
a school and a cadre of personnel for the purpose 
of military government and civil affairs provides 
a unique opportunity to draw expertise into and 
out of the military specifically to serve in niche 
roles that may not always be required. Civilians 
who have a specific expertise would potentially 
be put through the school and assigned a rank 
and position commensurate with their abilities 
and experience. This in turn would relieve the U.S. 
government of its overreliance on contractors and 
dramatically reduce the information asymmetry of 
purchasing an external capability. Finally, related 
to contractors, such a school has the potential to 
present a less expensive option than our current 
approach. The following section will address each 
reason in greater detail.
Improving 
Civil Affairs Expertise
Our Civil Affairs (CA) operators are for 
the most part uneducated and untrained for 
the roles we ask them to fill. We need real 
expertise in power systems, transportation 
and distribution, fuels and energy (utilities), 
banking and finance, payroll operations, 
sanitation, water purification, communications 
(including mail, radio and television 
broadcasting, telephone, data and satellite 
operations), contracting and personnel 
management. CA officers and NCOs are 
currently pressed into jobs they might know 
something about, but too often we expect 
a reservist who works for a bank to know 
how to set up a banking system. It should be 
obvious that this does not work very well.64
Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Kimmey, 
U.S. Army Reserve, Civil Affairs, 
Army Magazine, 2005
Although contemporary military doctrine places 
responsibility for civil-military operations on the 
shoulders of military commanders, civil affairs 
forces provide expertise to commanders in the 
interface with civil societies in the following areas: 
rule of law, economic stability, governance, public 
health and welfare, infrastructure, and public 
education and information.65 In practice, however, 
there are few requirements to be qualified to serve 
in one of the aforementioned functional specialties. 
There are cases where reserve officers have a 
civilian career or an academic background in a 
particular functional area, but this is the exception 
rather than the rule. Even when civil affairs 
personnel possess expertise in a particular function, 
the type or level of expertise may be a mismatch. 
For example, a public school teacher may be 
identified to have a specialty in the area of public 
education, but be ill-suited to design a provincial or 
national-level school system. 
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64. Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Kimmey, “Transforming Civil Affairs,” Association of the United States Army’s Army Magazine, March 2005.
65. U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, September 2006.
66. Kathleen H. Hicks, Christine E. Wormuth, and Eric Ridge, “The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,”  Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, February 2009.
67. Civil Affairs Association, Civil Affairs Issue Papers, November 2007.
68. Amitai Etzioni, “Whose COIN?” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 60 (1st Quarter, 2011).
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Most importantly, the civil affairs education 
system itself does not offer a specialized program 
of study for any of the six areas of expertise 
it claims to provide. All civil affairs officers go 
through the typical Army education system, which 
may provide a few hours of discussion about civil-
military relations or civil considerations in military 
operations, but lacks depth and breadth in the 
spectrum of problems faced by those charged 
with the interface between the military and civil 
society.66 Those officers transitioning into the 
civil affairs branch receive nine weeks of training. 
A school of military government would provide 
more targeted theoretical and practical training 
for civil affairs generalists. Furthermore, a more 
comprehensive program should be developed in 
each of the six specialty areas, which in many ways 
correspond to the capabilities required for effective 
nation building. The Civil Affairs Association, a 
trade organization founded after World War II 
that represents the professional interests of 8,000 
reserve and active duty civil affairs personnel, 
itself recognizes the need for more rigorous and 
systematic training of civil affairs personnel. It 
suggests that, 
The emerging roles of civil affairs forces 
demand knowledge of civil-sector institutions 
and systems; foreign language, customs 
and mores; contractual arrangements and 
ethical practices with private businesses and 
other civil-sector organizations; coordination 
and negotiation techniques; political and 
historical background; United Nations and 
other international organizations; other U.S. 
government agencies; nongovernmental 
organizations; and non-state actors as well 
current U.S. military doctrine and foreign 
militaries’ civil affairs capabilities.67
A model based upon the one used in World 
War II still holds great relevance today. The first 
portion of the school could be a rigorous study 
of past instances of military government and 
civil affairs to discuss best practices. In addition, 
focused study in the areas of law, economics and 
entrepreneurship, governance, public health and 
welfare, infrastructure, and public education and 
information provides a basis for advising military 
commanders in occupational duties. Each civil 
affairs officer needs some basic level of expertise 
in each of the aforementioned areas. However, 
individualized programs that focus on the six 
areas (rule of law, economic stability, governance, 
public health and welfare, infrastructure, and 
public education and information) are requisite 
for supporting military operations. Greater 
specialization should be encouraged so that 
civil affairs officers have the ability to provide 
commanders with more specific advice, such as 
how to foster economic growth in a specific area 
or what steps should be taken when reestablishing 
local governance structures. The second portion of 
the program would be practically focused, running 
through scenarios and simulation for the purpose 
of experiential learning. 
Finally, the school would serve as a repository for 
lessons learned and provide reach back capability 
for those nation-builders actively engaged in their 
craft. Often, the expectations of those responsible 
for nation building far exceed the realm of the 
possible. In fact, one advantage of having educated 
personnel charged with providing commanders 
and policymakers advice is that whole scale societal 
change should be foregone for something far more 
realistic.68 These “nation-builders” would help in 
suggesting which few existing societal elements 
should be reformed and which should be co-opted. 
The faculty and students at the school should 
incorporate best practices from the field as well 
as use real-world case problems from the field as 
learning opportunities. Those civil affairs officers 
who are generalists would have a place to call or 
email for assistance when facing a problem beyond 
their skill set.  
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Developing Nation-Building 
Expertise in Other Branches
Nation-building encompasses a number of 
objectives. The two most notable objectives 
are establishing a representative government 
and setting conditions which will allow for 
economic growth and individual prosperity.
Colonel Jayne A. Carson,  
“Nation-Building: The  
American Way,” 2003 
 
 
In addition to civil affairs forces, strategic 
intelligence and strategist personnel both would 
benefit from more specialized training in nation-
building-related tasks. For war planning purposes 
alone, both the intelligence and strategist 
community should have a greater understanding 
of the economic conditions of the country in 
question to appropriately and adequately inform 
military course-of-action development. There are 
many aspects of the political economy of territories 
that impact the security considerations for military 
forces. Moreover, economic considerations have 
been the most ignored of all concerns along the 
entire spectrum of conflict. 
Strategic intelligence
The strategic intelligence field is concerned 
with broad issues such as economics, political 
assessments, military capabilities, and intentions 
of foreign nations.69 Officers who are selected 
to specialize in strategic intelligence attend a 
yearlong program of instruction at the National 
Defense Intelligence College, which focuses on 
military strategy as it pertains to intelligence, 
intelligence collection and analysis, geostrategic 
issues, and transnational threats. The one piece 
largely missing from the curriculum is economics. 
A school of military government could provide 
an additional intelligence capability—one that 
provides early warning of civil unrest, study of 
politics and economics of specific areas of probable 
military concern, and analysis of key indicators 
that may illustrate a propensity for conflict. Such 
specialization within the intelligence community 
could provide more nuanced advice to commanders 
both pre-conflict and post conflict in terms of how 
civil considerations may impact military operations, 
how resources might best be spent to influence 
portions of the population most at risk of returning 
to conflict, or who are the key power brokers 
with the potential for the greatest impact on the 
indigenous population. Such information would be 
invaluable to commanders trying to decipher who 
to partner with in a given population. 
Strategic plans and policy
A complimentary capability to the strategic 
intelligence function is the strategic plans and 
policy function. Strategists specialize in the 
development and implementation of national 
strategic plans and policies; theater strategy and 
campaign planning; and the evolution of concepts 
and doctrine for employing military forces at 
the operational and strategic levels of warfare. 
In appreciation of the significant impact that 
strategists have on the strategic level of warfare, 
they are required to attend a specialized course, 
“Basic Strategy Arts Program” (BSAP), which is a 
fourteen-week program that focuses on strategic 
theory, strategic art, joint and Army systems, 
national security decision making, contemporary 
security challenges, and joint and Army planning.70 
BSAP is instructive because the format is similar 
to the proposed SOMG, but it is focused on 
operational and strategic art as it pertains primarily 
to war planning. A SOMG could supplement 
such a course by offering a unique perspective 
on the types of considerations that are vital to an 
effective war-to-peace transition, such as economic 
growth and rule of law considerations. Political and 
69. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Army, December 2005).
70. Charles P. Moore, “What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist (Now)?” Parameters (Winter 2009−2010), 6.
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economic considerations should play a significant 
role in military strategy. Furthermore, planning for 
the postwar phase and the transition between the 
military and the civilian administration remains the 
most challenging portion of contingency planning. 
A SOMG could provide an educational opportunity 
for strategists who may be assigned at combatant 
commands, the National Security Council, or other 
key defense organizations where such planning is 
vital. Enrollment in the SOMG would supplement 
existing educational opportunities within the 
strategist functional area. 
Personnel Innovation
Reform the Army Personnel System...Get 
more personal adaptability and openness in 
assignment and promotions … Find ways to 
creatively ease out the perfect “up or out” 
industrial-age promotion pyramid: enable 
officers to drop back year groups, open up 
direct commissions for selected skills …
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Dave Barno, 
“Dave Barno’s Top Ten for 
General Dempsey, the new 
Army Chief of Staff,” January 2011
Reestablishing a school of military government 
also offers an innovative opportunity to address 
the personnel challenges inherent in providing 
nation building expertise. In the World War II era 
and before, personnel could be commissioned for 
a specific job at a specific rank. As the military 
has become a professional all-volunteer force, 
this opportunity has been lost. There currently 
is no mechanism to bring in experts from the 
civilian world at a level commensurate with their 
experience and education. There is little incentive, 
patriotism aside, for well-qualified civilians to leave 
a highly paid job and start a career in the military. 
Using the historical model, the school could provide 
an institutional opportunity to on-board experts 
from the civilian world, either in the private sector, 
public sector, or academia, to an appropriate rank 
and position within the military. Running this 
school like a private company with parallel entry 
and exit and special personnel policies so that 
people can be frocked if necessary or hired on 
a short-term basis enables a more flexible surge 
capacity during times of excess demand.
An additional benefit to this approach is that 
entry into the military, or being hired as an Army 
civilian, has the potential to address the information 
asymmetry problems inherent in contracting out 
services. It also creates an opportunity to train 
civilians who would like to assist the military or 
development structure but also would like to return 
to their previous profession after some time serving 
their country. By creating an opportunity for lateral 
entry and exit for skill sets that aren’t in constant 
demand, nation-building support becomes cheaper 
in the long run and more effective. Furthermore, 
these trained professionals then would be prepared 
to operate in risk-laden environments. 
Conclusion
In the aftermath of World War II, America 
tackled the greatest postwar administration 
challenge it had ever faced. The School of Military 
Government prepared its students for postwar 
military government, which ultimately proved 
to be successful. The school effectively provided 
officers with expertise in the myriad tasks 
associated with nation building. During and in 
the years following World War II, those trained at 
the school played an integral part in all aspects 
of the war-to-peace transition—from establishing 
organizations to ensure public safety to standing 
up courts, governments, and schools. The United 
States currently is faced with equally ambitious 
and perhaps even more complicated nation-
building challenges, and it is worth rethinking how 
this model might be useful in today’s complex 
operating environment. Reestablishing a school of 
military government would provide the foundation 
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for the professionals charged with stabilizing areas 
suffering from upheaval and make them truly 
capable of overseeing nation building. 
A twentieth-century version of the school 
would have important impacts on the way the 
United States plans and implements occupational 
duties. First, by creating a corps of experts, war 
plans would be better informed by economic 
considerations—an area that has long been 
neglected in strategy and policy. In addition 
to improved planning, greater competence in 
implementing nation-building-related tasks also 
would make such endeavors more effective and 
efficient. Earlier and better planned interventions 
could be less costly and enable swifter exit. A 
school of military government would offer a 
rigorous program for specialists in rule of law, 
economic stability, governance, public health and 
welfare, infrastructure, and public education and 
information, and would collect nation-building 
lessons from the field, incorporating them into 
doctrine. Training nation-builders at such a school 
for duty in mid- and post-conflict occupations 
might just provide a cheaper and more effective 
way of approaching our current and future 
overseas engagements. 
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Appendix: U.S. Military Government in Germany
U.S. MeMber 
Allied Control 
AUthority
bipArtite boArd 
(U.S. MeMber)
CoMMAnder-in-Chief 
eUropeAn CoMMAnd And 
MilitAry Governor (CinCeUr)
offiCe of MilitAry GovernMent
for GerMAny (U.S.)
depUty MilitAry Governor And
CoMMAndinG GenerAl
Chief of StAff
politiCAl
AdviSer
bUdGet & 
fiSCAl 
direCtor
SeCretAry 
GenerAl
intelliGenCe
berlin 
CoMMAnd
ArMed
forCeS
liAiSon & 
SeCUrity 
offiCeS
dMG bAvAriA
Control 
offiCer
politiCAl 
AffAirS
Civil 
AdMiniStrAtion
liAiSon & 
SeCUrity 
offiCeS
dMG heSSe
perSonnel 
offiCer
pUbliC 
inforMAtion
edUCAtion 
& CUltUrAl 
relAtionS
liAiSon & 
SeCUrity 
offiCeS
dMG 
wUertteMberG
bAden
AdjUtAnt 
GenerAl
eConoMiCS
inforMAtion 
Control
reGionAl Gov’t 
CoordinAtinG
offiCe
inSpeCtor 
GenerAl
GovernMentAl 
AdMiniStrAtion
leGAl
liAiSon offiCe 
breMerhAven
dMG breMen
AUdit 
offiCe
CUltUrAl 
AffAirS
MAnpower
liAiSon 
offiCerS
dMG berlin 
SeCtor
finAnCe
property
Allied bAnkinG 
CoMMiSSion
joint 
export-
iMport 
AGenCy
MilitAry 
tribUnAlS
bipArtite 
Control 
offiCe
offiCe of the 
Chief CoUnSel 
for wAr CriMeS
AdMiniStrAtive ServiCeS for
U.S. perSonnel
U.S. eleMent
SpeCiAl
ASSiStAnt
direCtor of 
MAnAGeMent 
Control
SpeCiAl
AdviSer
direCtor of 
intelliGenCe
direCtor 
of CiviliAn 
perSonnel
ASSiStAnt to 
the dep. Mil. 
Gov.
CoordinAtinG 
CoMMittee 
(U.S. MeMber)
U.S.
SeCretArieS
direCtorAteS
inSpeCtor 
GenerAl
offiCe of the CoMMAnder-in -Chief, eUropeAn CoMMAnd
exeCUtiv e offiCe
offi CeS Advi SerS
field o ffiCeS
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